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I. Introduction 
In November, 1999, the United States was enjoying the fruits of seven years 
of unprecedented economic prosperity. In hindsight, although no one knew 
it at the time, that long economic expansion in United States history was 
beginning to falter. In the fall of 1999, however, things looked pretty rosy, 
especially in the financial services industry. In the securities sector, observers 
were noting the fact that a majority of U.S. households held stock either 
directly or through their retirement plans; 1 some folks were quitting their 
regular jobs to become day traders from home; 2 and some experts were 
beginning to wonder if the brokerage account would become the new core 
financial account for consumer finance. 3 In the mutual fund industry, commen-
tators were favorably impressed with the quantity of inflowing funds and with 
the willingness o{ individual investors to stay the course through ups and 
downs of the market without bolting for the exits. 4 The insurance industry 
was moving aggressively into the variable annuity market, selling products 
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. The author thanks Dean 
Donald Dunn of the Western New England College School of Law for supporting this project 
with a research grant. 
1 See, e.g., Worker Capitalists,WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1999, at A26 (noting with approval 
that some 80 million Americans, or 52% of households, own stocks, either directly or through 
their retirement plans). 
2 See Rebecca Buckman & Ruth Simon, Day Trading Can Breed Perilous Illusions, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999, at Cl (noting, among other things that some day traders had quit their 
regular jobs to earn their living by trading on-line). 
3 See Alan Levinsohn, Online Brokerage, the New 'Core Account?, ABA BANKING J., Sept. 
1999, at 34 (discussing the economics of securities brokerage accounts and the opportunities 
for cross-selling financial services from that platform). 
4 See E.S. Browning, What Moves Markets- New Forces Are Now Powering Surging Stocks 
- Ordinmy Joes Move Market Toward Dow 10000 Mark With Aid From TV, Internet, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 15, 1999, at Cl (dispelling the idea that the individual investor is the "dumb money" 
of the market); see also Pui-Wing Tam & Karen Damato, The First 10,000 Points, Mutual-Fund 
Cash Did Much to Wag the Dow, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1999, at C14 (observing the important 
role that individual investors played in moving the Dow above 10,000). 
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that looked a lot like mutual funds. 5 Finally, the banking sector was in the 
midst of a record quarter in terms of both retum on equity and return on assets. 6 
In 1999, despite some signs of weakness at small banks,7 the banking 
industry looked solid. The bank insurance fund was fully funded, and after 
the horrible years of the early 1990s, bank failures had slowed to a trickle, 
averaging fewer than five per year since 1995. 8 Of course, some dark clouds 
had begun to appear on the hmizon, such as the official savings rate going 
negative, but in general the fall of 1999 was a very good time to be in the 
financial services industry, especially in banking. Indeed, the crises of the 
1980s and early 1990s in the banking and savings and loan industdes seemed 
like a distant memory on November 12, 1999, when President Clinton signed 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act9 (the "GLB Act") into law. 
The GLB Act brought to an end decades of lobbying and deliberation over 
the shape and dimensions of the U.S. financial services industry. Among other 
things, the GLB Act broadened the permissible activities of banks and their 
affiliates. That aspect of the law received by far the most attention during its 
development in Congress and after its passage, yet the changes in activities 
in some ways merely formalized a change in the marketplace that had already 
been accomplished. 1o So while the law has been hailed as a major landmark 
by many, its practical impact may be substantially overstated. 11 Although 
5 See Bridget O'Brian, Variable-Annuities Business to Get Boost As More Price Competition 
Is Introduced, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1999, at C1 (discussing the aggressive marketing of variable 
annuity products in the insurance industry). 
6 See Rob Garver, Bank Profits on Less Firm Foundation, AM. BANKER, Dec. 20, 1999, at 
1 (reporting on the third quarter report from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
that commercial banks had produced record earnings). 
7 See Rob Garver, FDIC: 10% of Small Banks Losers in Record Prosperity, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 23, 1999, at 2 (noting that despite a third quarter in which commercial banks had produced 
record earnings, one in ten banks with assets of under $100 million lost money). 
8 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Data, Banking Industry: Historical, Bank 
Failures and Assistance, available at <www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/index.html> (site visited 
May 14, 2001) (statistics indicating that the FDIC provided assistance to six institutions in 1995, 
six in 1996, one in 1997, three in 1998 and eight in 1999). 
9 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified in various sections of 12, 
15, 16 and 18 U.S.C.). 
10 Banks and their regulators had been quite creative and innovative in figuring out ways 
to get around the various prod,uct line lim1tations that had been thrown in their way over the 
years. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
11 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 
25 J. CoRP. L. 691 (2000) (noting that the GLB Act merely "formalized the death" of the Glass-
Steagall Act). 
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reasonable minds can and do differ on the question of whether the GLB Act 
really reshapes the business of banking, everyone must agree on the proposi-
tion that the GLB Act made only modest changes to the regime for resolving 
failed banks. Essentially, the GLB Act added a couple of provisions to the 
existing bank resolution structure and let it go at that. 
Given the late 90's Zeitgeist and the political realities of passing the 
legislation, the fact that the GLB Act neglected to provide a new system to 
handle the prospect of bank failure should come as no surprise. The legislation 
did not address securities firm, mutual fund, or insurance company failure 
either. Given all of the various constituencies that had to be on board in order 
for the Glass-Steagall reform effort to get underway, no one wanted to bring 
up any possibly bad news that could rock the boat. Therefore, all of the details 
for resolving systemic threats were not worked out. Nevertheless, the neglected 
corner of banking policy concerning who should pay when a bank fails 
deserves to see the light of day. Good times do not last forever, 12 and when 
the banking industry hits the skids it would be helpful to have some idea of 
how to handle the problems that inevitably will arise. 
This paper examines how the cost of bank failure may be imposed on the 
corporate parents of bank subsidiaries in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act era. 
The paper begins with an overview of financial holding companies and the 
existing devices for imposing liability under the Bank Holding Company Act. 
The next section examines four open questions about the direction of banking 
policy as it relates to the resolution of failed banks. It concludes with the 
suggestion that further policy adjustments and refinement will be necessary 
to deal with the next round of bank failures. 
II. Financial Holding Companies As Bank Holding Companies 
And The Tools For Resolving Failed Banks 
Most of the commentary about the GLB Act has focused on the new powers 
permitted to financial institutions and the lifting of limits on traditional product 
lines by allowing the formation of financial holding companies (FHCs).13 
12 We are already witnessing a turndown in the subprime banking market. See Paul Beckett 
& John Hechinger, "Subprime" Could Be Bad News For Banks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, 
at Cl (reporting on the problems in the risky "subprime" lending market as a result of the 
downturn in economic conditions). 
13 The GLB Act radically changed the permissible activities of holding companies that own 
banks or other financial institutions and the permissible activities of national banks. The GLB 
Act created a new entity, the financial holding company ("FHC") to be the umbrella organization 
under which the expanded financial activities would take place. The GLB Act permits FHCs 
to engage in banking and activities "closely related" to banking (as previously permitted under 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rei.75A-D4/02 Pub.052) 
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Issues about privacy protection and concerns about the application of the 
Community Reinvestment Act also got some significant attention after the 
adoption of the GLB Act. The buzz sunounding the legislation did not, 
however, include much talk about innovative ways to resolve failed banking 
institutions. That is probably because there wasn't much to say. 
Any discussion of the GLB Act's impact on holding company liability would 
have to start with an often unnoticed reality: the GLB Act did not repeal the 
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA). Indeed, even after the GLB Act some 
bank holding companies (BHCs) may decide to maintain that status subject 
to the old nles on BHCs and not become a FHC. An institution planning to 
remain in) the traditionally defined business of !banking or which plans to 
develop new financial activities through subsidi:· ries of national banks need 
not form a FHC. On the other hand, for holdin · companies desiring to take 
advantage of the new activities permitted unde the GLB Act by acquiring 
non-banking affiliates not satisfying the BHCA definition of "closely related 
to banking," the GLB Act requires the establishment of a FHC. Despite all 
the changes wrought by the GLB Act, however, the federal banking regulatory 
scheme continues to regulate any organization that controls a "bank" 14 as a 
"bank holding company" 15 under the Bank Holding Company Act. 16 There-
fore, a FHC which controls a bank is technically a BHC as well as a FHC. 
Given the continuing application of bank holding company regulation, 
clarification of the legal consequences of bank failure for the parent company 
ought to be a high priority concern for policymakers. 
Determining the extent of holding company liability for bank failure has 
never been a simple task. Over the years, federal banking regulators have 
developed a range of techniques designed to impose liability on bank holding 
companies in the event of bank failure.17 In the emerging financial services 
the BHCA), and in addition to engage in other activities that are "financial in nature." GLB 
Act § 103(a), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). 
14 As defined by the Bank Holding Company Act, a "bank" is a financial institution "which 
(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages 
in the business of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). 
15 As defined by statute, a bank holding company is any company that has control over a 
bank or over a company that has control of a bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). Typically, although 
not always, bank holding companies are corporations, but see 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (defining 
"bank holding company" to mean any "corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or 
similar organization."). 
16 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. 
17 These regulatory mechanisms include, among other things: the so-called source of strength 
doctrine, 12 C.P.R. § 225.4(a), cross-guarantee provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e), capital 
restoration plans, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii), regulatory agreements, the elaboration of a 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Re1.75A-D4/02 Pub.052) 
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marketplace these holding company obligations will be imposed on FHCs and 
could also indirectly affect nonbanking affiliates within the FHC structure. 
If ownership of a bank creates excessive liability for a FHC and its non-bank 
affiliates, however, that liability could reduce significantly the benefits of the 
broad changes ushered in by the GLB Act. The significance of this potential 
liability is even greater when one takes into account the possibility that non-
financial commercial films may eventually be petmitted to own banks or that 
FHCs may acquire affiliates that push the envelope between banking and 
commerce. 18 
In any event, there do exist methods for imposing the cost of bank failure 
directly or indirectly onto the parent holding company. The three most 
impmtant regulatory devices available to achieve that goal are: (1) the cross-
guarantee provisions of FIRREA, (2) the "source of strength" doctrine, and 
(3) the "prompt corrective action" scheme. The usefulness of these devices 
will be affected by the GLB Act and by market trends in the financial services 
sector. I will examine each of them in tum. 
A. Cross-guarantee Provisions 
The cross-guarantee provisions were enacted as part of the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).19 
During the early 1990s, the cross-guarantee was the most powerful tool/ 
available to banking regulators for indirectly shifting the costs of bank failure 
to holding companies. In a nutshell, the cross-guarantee provisions allow the 
receiver of a failed bank to make claims against the sister banks of the failed 
institution for the loss that the receiver incurs or anticipates that it will incur 
in disposing of or assisting the failed depositary institution. 2o 
Although the cross-guarantee is a powerful tool, it is a limited one. It only 
allows a claim to be presented against other depositary institutions within the 
same holding company organization. In the cunent banking market, multi-bank 
bank holding companies are becoming increasingly rare. The decline of the 
multi-bank holding company is largely a function of reforms ushered in by 
general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable subordination, preferences, and fraudulent 
conveyances. See Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too 
Much?, 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 311, 333-45 (1997) [hereinafter Gouvin, Market Discipline] 
(describing the various regulatory methods in light of a pervasive scheme to impose liability 
on holding companies). 
18 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
19 The cross-guarantee provisions are codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e). 
20 /d. 
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the Reigle-Neal Act of 199421 that liberalized the branching regime and by 
the regulatory initiatives22 and judicial interpretations23 that loosened product 
line restrictions. In light of these changes, over the course of the 1990s fewer 
and fewer holding companies owned more than one bank subsidiary. 24 The 
demise of the multi-bank holding company will render the cross-guarantee 
provisions less effective as a means of shifting the costs of resolving a failed 
bank. If the cross-guarantee device becomes ineffectual, bank regulators will 
in all likelihood look for other ways to protect the deposit insurance fund. 
Therefore, we may find that the Federal Reserve Board's "source of strength" 
doctrine will have a new day in the sun. 
21 Riegle"Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified throughout 12 U.S.C.). 
22 During the mid-to-late 1990s the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal 
Reserve Board engaged in a form of regulatory competition to allow institutions under their 
supervision to engage in an ever-widening array of financial activities. For example, the 
Comptroller of the CutTency promulgated a regulation that petmitted national banks to fmm 
operating subsidiaries that could engage in activities such as equipment leasing, insurance, real 
estate brokerage, real estate development, and securities underwriting: See 61 Fed. Reg. 
60342-87 (1996). Not to be outdone, the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation Y, which 
covers the activities of bank holding companies, to specify that "closely related" activities 
include such things as acting as investment advisor to mutual funds, leasing property, providing 
data processing services, providing courier services, performing real estate appraisals, providing 
investment advice on financial futures and options, and providing tax preparation services in 
addition to the activities already on the list or approved by court decision. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25. 
The Fed then went further and loosened the restrictions between banks and their securities 
affiliates within the holding company structure. See Review of Restrictions on Director and 
Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities and Purchase and Sale of Financial Assets, 
61 Fed. Reg. 57679 (1996); Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of 
Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
68750 (1996). 
23 For the past twenty years the banking industry has been fighting in court to expand its 
permissible activities. The string of successful lawsuits includes: Securities Industry Ass'n v. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Schwab), 468 U.S. 207 (1984) (allowing 
bank holding companies to, among other things, provide discount brokerage services); Citibank, 
73 FED. REs. BuLL. 473 (1987), a.ff'd sub nom. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Govemors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming ability to underwrite 
mortgage-backed securities), Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (affirming ability 
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds); and Barnett Bank of Marion Connty, N.A. v. Nelson, 
517 U.S. 25 (1996) (settling the issue of whether Section 92 of the National Bank Act permits 
banks with offices in towns with population of less than 5,000 to sell insurance). 
24 KeyCorp is a prime example of this trend, going from twelve bank subsidiaries before 
Riegle-Neal to one afterward. See Brett Chase, As Milestone Nears, Banks Prepare to Centralize, 
AM. BANKER, May 15, 1997, at 4. 
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B. Source Of Strength 
Under the source of strength doctrine as articulated in a Federal Reserve 
Policy Statement, bank holding companies are required to assist bank subsidia-
ries in difficult financial times by providing financial assistance to them. 25 
Although as a legal matter the validity of the source of strength remains an 
open question, 26 the Federal Reserve Board continues to employ the source 
of strength idea in its decisions, 2 7 and the GLB Act treats the doctrine as if 
it were a well-established and settled aspect of banking law. 
If the cross-guarantee provisions have been rendered ineffectual by changes 
in the banking industry, the Fed might turn to the source of strength as theit 
backup position for extracting financial support from the holding companies 
that own troubled banks. A return to the source of strength doctrine could 
mean that bank holding companies and, indirectly, their affiliates will 
essentially become liable without limit for the losses that may occur when 
an insured bank fails. 
Indeed, the GLB Act contains some provisions that seem to indicate that 
the federal regulators are going to return to the source of strength doctrine. 
In particular, GLB Act Section 112(a) 28 adds a new provision designed to 
hem in the Fed's ability to order a BHCIFHC to provide "funds or other assets" 
to a bank from an insurance company, broker/dealer, investment company or 
investment advisor. Implicit in the provision is the belief that the Fed as 
regulator of FHCs and BHCs possesses the power to order such transfers, either 
through an expanded cross-guarantee provision or through an open-ended 
source of strength power. The new provision seeks to modify this implied 
power by requiring that such orders be made in coordination with the 
appropriate insurance or securities regulators, who shall have a veto power 
if they find that the proposed Fed directive would have a "material adverse 
effect" on the financial condition of the non-bank financial entity. 29 
Section 112(a) may only be a preemptive strike to make clear that neither 
the source of strength doctrine nor the cross-guarantee provisions cover 
25 See Federal Reserve System, Policy Stateme/lt; Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies 
to Act as Sources of Strength to Their Subsidimy Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15707 (1987). 
26 For a brief discussion of the evolution of the source of strength doctrine and the legal 
issues surrounding its validity, see Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 17, at 333-36; Leonard 
Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The "Source of Strength" Doctrine: Formulating the Future of 
America's Financial Mm*ets, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 269 (1993). 
27 See, e.g., Amplicon, Inc., 87 FED. REs. BULL. 421, 422 (2001); New Prague Bancshares, 
Inc., 83 FED. REs. BuLL. 909 (1997). 
28 Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g). 
29 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g)(l). 
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non-bank affiliates. Certainly the section can be seen as at least a signal from 
Congress that while the cross-guarantee provisions continue to apply to bank 
subsidiaries, they will not be extended in an unaltered form to non-bank 
affiliates. There is a catch, however. The Fed, as umbrella regulator of FHCs, 
can retaliate against financial services providers (and their non-banking 
regulators) who refuse to support failing banks. The provision allows the Fed I 
to order divestiture of the bank if the securities or insurance regulator does 
not agree to the requested transfer. 3o 
Another provision of the GLB Act has also been discussed in connection 
with the source of strength doctrine. Section 730 of the GLB Act31 adds a 
new provision to clarify the source of strength doctrine as it plays out in the 
insolvency proceedings of the holding company parents of failed banks. Often 
the regulators of a failing depositary institution extract resources from a bank 
holding company to prop up the failing bank. Sometimes the receiver of the 
failed bank denies claims against the bank presented by the holding company 
or by holding company affiliates on the grounds that those transactions were 
fraudulent or preferential or on the grounds that they ought to be subordinated 
on equitable grounds. If the holding company itself is near insolvency, some 
of those actions by the regulators and the receiver in extracting resources from 
the holding company or denying claims against the failed bank may be attacked 
by other creditors of the holding company under bankmptcy law. 
Section 730 of the GLB Act strengthens the position of federal banking 
regulators in bank holding company bankmptcy proceedings and in doing so 
will likely embolden the Fed to exercise the power it believes it possesses 
under the source of strength doctrine. Under the new provision, federal banking 
regulators (including the FDIC when acting in the capacity of conservator or 
receiver of an insolvent federally insured financial institution) are insulated 
from any claims arising in bankruptcy proceedings with respect to assets 
transfened from the bankmpt holding company (or an affiliate or controlling 
shareholder of the holding company) to or for the benefit of an insured 
depository institution. 32 
Specifically, the GLB Act shields every banking agency from any claim 
for the return of assets, monetary damages, or other relief, either legal or 
equitable, if the depository institution receiving the transfer was subject to 
a capital directive at the time of the transfer or was undercapitalized. 33 The 
30 12 u.s.c. § 1844(g)(3). 
31 Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(u). 
32 12 U.S.C. § 1828(u)(1). 
33 12 U.S.C. § 1828(u)(2). 
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GLB Act makes clear that the protection for the banking agencies extends 
to claims based on state or federal law including preference or fraudulent 
u·ansfer or conveyance, excluding, however, claims based on an actual intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud. 34 In light of these provisions, it looks as if the 
source of strength doctrine will once again have its day in the sun. 
C. Capital Restoration Plans/Prompt Corrective Action 
Another approach to dealing with troubled banks was set out in the capital 
restoration scheme contained in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). FDICIA requires institutions defined as 
"undercapitalized" to submit a Capital Restoration Plan (CRP) to the institu-
tion's federal banking agency. 35 If a bank holding company controls the 
financial institution, FDICIA prohibits the banking agency from approving the 
CRP unless the holding company guarantees compliance with the CRP for 
one year and provides adequate assurances of compliance. 3 6 This could be 
a very powerful tool for extracting support from a bank holding company. 
But the CRP is not just useful to the banking regulators, it also provides 
some benefit to bank holding companies. By guaranteeing the subsidiary's 
obligations under a CRP, a holding company limits its direct liability for the 
institution's failure to the lower of either "an amount equal to 5 percent of 
the institution's total assets at the time the institution became undercapitalized" 
or "the amount which is necessary (or would have been necessary) to bring 
the institution into compliance with all capital standards applicable" at the time 
the institution failed to comply with the plan. 37 
On the other hand, if the financial institution fails to submit a plan or to 
implement a plan that has been submitted and approved, FDICIA provides 
the regulators with a number of sanctions to employ against the institution, 
including the power to seize the institution. It should be noted, however, that 
no provision of FDICIA expressly requires a holding company to guarantee 
compliance with a subsidiary's Capital Restoration Plan. 
This trio of devices, the cross-guarantee provisions, the source of strength 
doctrine, and the prompt conective action scheme, remain the workhorses of 
the regulator's approach to resolving failed banks. How these provisions will 
actually be employed in the next round of banking industry distress is an open 
34 12 U.S.C. § 1828(u)(2)(B). 
35 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(D)(i)-(e)(2)(D)(ii). 
36 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii)(I). 
37 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(E). 
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46 BANKING LAW III 
issue. The next section discusses some of the unanswered questions surround-
ing the future use of these devices. 
III. Questions About Failed Bank Resolution Remaining After 
The GLB Act 
Although the first section took pains to note that the GLB Act does not 
change the existing law in any major way, there are some big unanswered 
questions about the future resolution of failed institutions that ought to be 
addressed before we arrive at the next banking crisis. 
A. How Much Deference Should Be Given To The Legal Form? 
The first big problem about how to allocate the costs of resolving a failed 
bank has dogged this area of law since the beginning of time: how much 
deference should the legal form of the constituents of the holding company 
be given? Ordinarily under corporate law the liabilities of a corporation do 
not extend to its parent or to other corporations in the same group although 
there are occasions when it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil of a 
subsidiary to reach the parent or to hold the parent liable for a subsidiary's 
conduct by virtue of enterprise liability. 38 In banking, however, it seems that 
our regulatory system obsesses about separate legal identity in chartering, 
capital, and operations, but then seeks to disregard separate legal forms in the 
resolution of failed banks. Indeed, prior to the GLB Act, regulatory approval 
for new activities generally included the erection of so-called "firewalls" to 
shield the bank from the activities of other firms in the holding company 
family. 
While the GLB Act does not use the terminology of "firewalls," the new 
law clearly still cares a lot about which corporate entities are delivering which 
financial products and services. The GLB Act is riddled with firewall-like 
corporate formalities that must be observed in order to proceed with new 
opportunities. Here is a non-exhaustive list of some of the new corporate 
formalities contained in the GLB Act: 
38 The topic of corporate group liability has been discussed in great detail by Prof. Phillip 
Blumberg in his treatise. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAw oF CoRPORATE GROUPs: 
PROCEDURE (1983), PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: BANKRUPTCY 
(1985), PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW 
(1987), PHILLIP J. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: STATUTORY LAW OF 
GENERAL APPLICATION (1989), PHILLIP J. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: 
STATUTORY LAW OF SPECIFIC APPLICATION (1992), and PHILLIP J. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF 
CORPORATE GROUPS: STATE STATUTORY LAW (1995). 
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1. In the area of new activities conducted through bank financial subsidia-
ries GLB Act Section 121 spells out the requirements for financial 
subsidiaries of national banks. Significantly, the parent bank must have 
reasonable procedures and policies in place to preserve the bank's 
separate legal identity and limited liability. 39 
2. In addition, the parent bank must deduct the aggregate amount of its 
equity investment in the subsidiary from the assets and tangible equity 
of the bank and deduct the investment from its total risk-based capital. 
The consolidated total assets of all the bank's financial subsidiaries, 
in aggregate, may not exceed the lesser of $50 billion or 45% of the 
bank's consolidated total assets. 40 
3. When a national bank seeking to establish a financial subsidiary is 
one of the nation's 100 largest insured banks, as measured by the 
bank's consolidated total assets at the end of the calendar year, 
additional formalities come into play: (1) banks ranking in the top 50 
largest will be required to have outstanding "eligible debt" carrying 
one of the three highest investment-grade ratings; (2) banks in the next 
50 largest will have the option of meeting the requirement using 
alternative criteria. 4 1 Parent banks may avoid the eligible debt require-
ment altogether, however, if the financial subsidiary being established 
acts solely in an agency role. 42 These provisions show how the GLB 
Act cares about what is being done by which entities and the way in 
which the activity is carried out. 
4. The provisions dealing with financial subsidiaries of national banks 
allow some activities, but require that others be conducted only through 
holding company affiliates, again indicating an implicit premise that 
it matters which corporate entity is delivering which services. 43 
5. The GLB Act extended the prohibitions on inter-affiliate transactions 
contained in Sections 23A and 23B to transactions within a bank/ 
financial subsidiary setting. 44 If the holding company enterprise were 
39 Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24a(d)(2). 
40 12 U.S.C. § 24a(c). 
4112 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(3). 
42 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(4). 
43 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(B) (specifying the types of activities that financial sub-
sidiaries of national banks may conduct) with 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (describing the types 
of activities that holding companies may engage in through subsidiaries). 
44 12 U.S.C. § 37lc. 
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just one big undifferentiated operation where corporate form did not 
matter, the need for inter-affiliate restrictions would not exist. 
6. The GLB Act also resulted in new regulations covering the proper 
sharing of customer information among affiliates. 45 This too indicates 
that different corporate actors within the holding company have 
different rights depending on the corporate form. 
It is clear, therefore, that the GLB Act believes that the separate corporate 
entities in a financial conglomerate have some significance. How much is the 
big question. I have argued elsewhere that it seems a bit unfair for the banking 
regulatory scheme to insist on banks' adherence to myriad corporate formali-
ties, including most significantly, capital requirements, and then to attempt 
to disregard the corporate forms within the holding company structure when 
it comes time to resolve a failed bank subsidiary of a bank holding company. 46 
45 As a follow-up to the inter-affiliate information-sharing study required by Section 509 
of the GLB Act and the auth01ization in Section 506 of the GLB Act for the federal banking 
regulators to clarify the operation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, in October 2000, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the CmTency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision jointly proposed regulations to implement 
the provisions of the GLB Act dealing with information sharing among affiliates. See 65 Fed. 
Reg. 63120 (Oct. 20, 2000); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 16624 (March 27, 2001) (update). The 
regulations establish mles permitting affiliates to share certain inf01mation among themselves 
without being obligated to meet the regulatory restrictions imposed on consumer reporting 
agencies under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The inf01mation-sharing regulations build 
on the earlier regulations implementing the FCRA and the 1996 amendments to the FCRA 
contained in the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act (the "1996 Amendments"). The 1996 
Amendments had petmitted financial institutions to share "other inf01mation," such as character 
and credit worthiness information not based solely on transactional experience between the 
institution and the consumer, provided the financial institution gave the consumer an opportunity 
to opt out of the information-sharing arrangement. The 1996 Amendments, however, expressly 
prohibited the banking agencies from promulgating regulations to implement the changes in 
the law. The new information-sharing regulations, therefore, provide long overdue guidance 
to make clearer what "other information" is and how to provide an appropriate opportunity 
to opt out. In general, the regulations say that a financial institution may share what is now 
defined as "Opt Out Information" with affiliates if prior to such sharing the financial institution 
has: (1) provided a "clear and conspicuous" opt out notice to the consumer, (2) given the 
consumer a reasonable opportunity and means to opt out, and (3) taken steps to make sure 
the consumer has not opted out. Failure to observe these requirements will result in the shared 
information being considered a "consumer report" for FCRA purposes, which would also mean 
the full set of FCRA requirements would apply. The new regulations are located in the Code 
of Federal Regulations as follows: 12 C.P.R. Part 41 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
12 C.P.R. Part 222 (Federal Reserve System), 12 C.P.R. Part 334 (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation), and 12 C.P.R. Part 571 (Office of Thrift Supervision). 
46 See Gauvin, Market Discipline, supra note 17. 
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Conceptually, the argument for respecting the separate corporate existence 
of banks rests most solidly on the capital requirements imposed on banks. 
Although securities firms and insurance companies are subject to capital 
requirements, those schemes are designed to accomplish different ends. 47 Bank 
capital is driven in large part over concern for systemic risk. 48 This is less 
important in the insurance industry and to a lesser extent the securities industry, 
where capital requirements seem to be designed primarily to protect custom-
ers. 49 
Banks also are subject to the international capital adequacy guidelines 
promulgated by the Basle Committee. In January 2001, the Basle Committee 
proposed revisions to the existing risk-based capital scheme cunently in 
place. 5o The new scheme responds to criticism that the 1988 Accord, as 
modified over the years, was too blunt an instrument and one which sometimes 
created perverse incentives. 51 The new Accord recognizes the devilishly 
difficult task of conectly calibrating capital and risk in the modem financial 
world where derivative securities and securitized loan portfolios are available 
to ameliorate (or aggravate) the inherent risk in a given portfolio. It addresses 
the problem by doing a daring thing - deferring to the bankers who, if they 
are good bankers, don't need formal capital guidelines to tell them what to 
do because over the long run a properly capitalized firm is a successful firm. 
The Basle proposals unveiled in 2001 have three key components: (1) a 
more sophisticated method of translating credit risk into capital requirements; 
(2) increased regulatory supervision; and (3) enhanced disclosure requirements 
designed to promote market discipline. 52 Some banking commentators and 
academics had been urging the Basle Committee to incorporate mandatory 
subordinated debt into the global capital standards as a mechanism for creating 
greater market discipline for banking organizations, but that change was not 
included in the final proposal. 
47 For a general discussion of capital standards in the various financial services industries, 
see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND 
INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK, GAO/GGD-98-153 (JULY 1998). 
48 Id. at 8. 
49 Id. at 5-6. 
50 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, The New 
Basle Capital Accord (January 2001). 
51 See Stronger Foundations, THE EcoNOMIST, Jan. 20, 2001 at 67-68; see also Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document, 
Overview of The New Basle Capital Accord (January 2001). 
52Jd. 
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Although the Basle Committee did not incorporate a subordinated debt 
requirement into the new capital requirements, current research suggests that 
such a requirement would make good sense. A recent empirical study using 
data from European banks found that holders of subordinated notes and 
debentures are capable of discriminating between the different risk profiles 
of various banks; that policy changes, such as repudiation of "Too Big To 
Fail" implicit guarantees, affects the spread on the debentures; and that 
requiring banks to issue subordinated debt would likely enhance market 
discipline of banks and supplement regulatory discipline. 5 3 This study joins 
several other studies showing a statistically significant correlation between 
subordinated debt spreads and bank risk, after early studies found no such 
correlation. 54 
For a scheme of market discipline to work, however, several prerequisites 
need to be in place: (1) a market for the security that is going to serve as 
the discipline-sending signal; (2) useful infotmation about the health of the 
bank so the holders of the security can make appropriate pricing decisions; 
and (3) a credible threat of failure (i.e., no secret TBTF doctrine lurking in 
the wings) that forces the valuations to be based on the perfotmance of the 
institution and not on the discounted possibility of a government bailout. This 
last point provides a bridge to the next big question. 
B. Do We Really Believe In Market Discipline, Or, In Other 
Words, Is Too Big To Fail Really Relegated To Truly 
Extraordinary Situations? 
An issue that has haunted banking policy for a long time revolves around 
whether banking regulators will really allow market discipline to work. That 
is, if the market is to send a message to bank management and to the regulators, 
the purchasers of bank securities need to believe . that they could lose their 
investment. The fear of being completely wiped out is lost, however, where 
government bank resolution practices provide an implicit guarantee for 
investors and depositors. 
The problem of the implied guarantee is not news. In earlier rounds of 
banking reform Congress tried to effectively eliminate the "Too Big to Fail 
Doctrine" ("TBTF") by strengthening the requirement of "least cost resolution" 
that is imposed on the FDIC' s actions. 55 The least cost resolution requirement, 
53 Andrea Sironi, Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Indusfly: Evidence 
from Subordinated Debt Issues, PEDS Working Paper No. 2000-40, available at <pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 249284>. 
54 Id. at 2-6 (surveying the literature). 
55 12 U.S.C. § l823(c)(4). 
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however, exists side-by-side with a provision giving authority to the FDIC 
to make payments in excess of the insurance coverage amounts if necessary 
to avoid systemic risk. 56 Granted, the exercise of the "systemic risk" authority 
has been made intentionally very politically costly, 57 but the mere existence 
of the provision provides evidence that TBTF is not dead. How these two 
provisions will work together in the future remains to be seen. 
Bank regulators like to talk the talk of market discipline, and the new Basle 
Accord relies on market discipline as its third pillar, but by definition invoking 
"market discipline" also means embracing the idea that some banks will fail 
- even big banks. Indeed, we really cannot have both market discipline and 
routine TBTF at the same time. But real market discipline is politically 
awkward. To close down a bank and leave some claimants unpaid will be 
a political as well as a financial decision. 
The system would work better if we had lots of participants chiming in 
with their two cents worth on what the bank was doing. We have regular 
review by regulators, of course, and shareholders provide some feedback to 
bank management as well. Providing a role for debtholders might be the 
missing piece of the market discipline system. 
The previous section noted that the New Basle Capital Accord almost 
prescribed a requirement for mandatory subordinated debt in the capital 
structure of banks. Proponents of mandatory subordinated debt claim that the 
publicly traded market for that debt could act as an early waming system for 
risky activity in a banking organization because the subordinated debt holders, 
unlike the equity holders, would not share in the gains of any unduly risky 
activity and so would be likely to demand a higher risk premium when the 
banking organization veers off into dangerous levels of risk-taking. 
The idea has received some attention domestically. In a couple of places, 
the GLB Act takes notice of the concept. First, as noted above, in some 
circumstances, national banks that plan to establish a financial subsidiary must 
maintain the requisite amount of "eligible debt."58 Second, the GLB Act 
56 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G). 
57 Congress imposed an extensive and politically difficult procedure that must be carried out 
before the systemic risk payments can be made: Among other things, the process to expend 
funds must be initiated by a two-thirds majority of either the FDIC board or the Federal Reserve 
Board; the non-initiating board must approve the initiative of the other board; the Secretary 
of the Treasury must determine that the systemic risk concern is justified; and the FDIC must 
recover the costs of TBTF by way of a special assessment to the members of the insurance 
fund. !d. 
58 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(3). 
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required the Fed to prepare a study on the advisability of including subordi-
nated debt in the capital requirements of banks. 59 When the Fed released the 
study, it is fair to say that they gave the idea of mandatory subordinated debt 
a mixed reception. 60 The Fed report determined that subordinated debt would 
provide five primary benefits to the economy: (1) it would improve direct 
market discipline; (2) it would supplement the "indirect" market discipline 
exerted by government regulators and secondary market participants; (3) it 
would encourage transparency and disclosure by banking organizations; (4) 
it would increase the size of the financial cushion for the deposit insurance 
funds; and (5) it might reduce the risk of slow regulatmy response to crisis 
situations. 61 Despite these anticipated benefits, however, the Fed recom-
mended against implementing a subordinated debt requirement at the present 
time. The study concluded that while the creation of a mandatory subordinated 
debt capital structure for the largest U.S. banking organizations would likely 
increase the safety and soundness of the financial system, the cost to banks 
of implementing the regime did not justify a policy change at the present 
time.62 
The results of the subordinated debt study seem to suggest a small amount 
of backsliding on the market discipline issue: the Fed recognizes that 
mandatory subordinated debt would enhance market discipline, yet at the same 
time backed away from it. The agency has taken that tack even while preparing 
to implement the Basle Accord with its new emphasis on market dis~ipline. 
One wonders what other policies might be articulated in one place and undercut 
in another, which leads to the next question. 
A. Will Prompt Corrective Action (Be Allowed To) Work? 
The third big question concerns the prompt corrective action regime. It has 
yet to be tested under serious stress and one cannot help but wonder if the 
system will work as intended and whether the regulators will allow it to work 
as intended. One way to look at the PCA system is as an option. Bank holding 
companies that own undercapitalized institutions are given a choice: put up 
more capital and cap your losses, or refuse to put up more capital and declare 
your intention to let the bank fail. 63 The optional aspect of these plans may 
59 GLB Act § 108. 
60 Federal Reserve Board, The Feasibility and Desirability of Mandatory Subordinated Debt 
(Dec. 2000), available at <www .federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/debt/ 
subord_debt_2000.pdf>. 
61 !d. at 24-36. 
62 /d. at 56-57. 
63 See Gauvin, Market Discipline, supra note 17, at 338-39. 
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have been designed to facilitate early resolution of the insured institutions by 
requiring the holding company to either face up to its commitments or signal 
that it is not willing to do so. 
While this anangement provides the holding company with some flexibility 
regarding the commitment to the troubled subsidiary, failure to back a CRP 
could have catastrophic results for the holding company. Without the limita-
tions created by the guarantee of the CRP, holding company liability for the 
bank's failure could be great, and failure to back up the CRP could raise the 
ire of the regulators who could find ways to punish an uncooperative holding 
company. So, when viewed in a more skeptical light, that apparent leeway 
afforded by the CRP provisions could in reality be nothing more than an 
invitation to play a high stakes game of "chicken" with the regulators. 
This may be especially true in light of recent experience in the savings and 
loan industry where PCA did not work well because the capital reporting from 
the covered institutions indicated the institutions' solvency up to the last 
months before closure. Existing accounting rules, trends in the banking 
industry, and the risk profiles of covered institutions undermined the reliability 
of the capital data in the months leading up to failure. 64 Yet while it is true 
that PCA has not been in place through a full blown banking crisis, some 
empirical evidence points to PCA as being effective in improving bank capital 
ratios and portfolio risk levels. 65 
So, while PCA may prove to be a useful tool in addressing losses from 
failed banks, we cannot be sure that it will work as planned. 
B. What Are We Trying To Accomplish When We Resolve A 
Failed Bank? 
Finally, the most difficult problem facing banking regulators in formulating 
a coherent and justifiable policy for imposing liability on bank holding 
companies is to articulate what exactly the imposition of that liability is 
supposed to achieve. I have discussed elsewhere 6 6 that the rationale that 
currently infmms policy choices is murky and rarely articulated with clarity. 
If the law is going to impose liability on holding companies for debts of their 
64 See Pamela Atkins, Bank Failures: Prompt Corrective Action Not Enough in Recent Bank 
Failures, OTS's Seidman Says, 73 BNA BANKING REP. 987 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
65 See Raj Aggarwal & Kevin T. Jacques, Assessing the Impact of Prompt Corrective Action 
on Bank Capital and Risk, 4 FED. REs. BANK N.Y. EcoN. PoL'Y REv. 23 (Oct. 1998). 
66 See Eric J. Gouvin, Of Hungl)' Wolves and Horizontal Conflicts: Rethinking the Justifica-
tions for Bank Holding Company Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 949 [hereinafter Gouvin, 
Hung1y Wolves]. 
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banking subsidiaries, there needs to be a legitimate policy justification for 
doing so. There have been some policy justifications offered over the years, 
but they generally do not withstand close scmtiny very well. 
Obviously, the first guiding principle for resolving a failed bank is to make 
the insured depositors whole. This goal is relatively uncontroversial and 
relatively easily achieved. We have a deposit insurance system that charges 
risk-related premiums to cover the insured peril6 7 and the insurance funds are 
sound. This goal cannot fully explain why the law seeks to impose liability 
above and beyond the limits of the banks' corporate form. Indeed, if protecting 
insured depositors were our only concern, we would see a serious policy 
pushing toward the so-called "nanow bank" idea that would be very low risk 
for depositors and low return for banks. But we have not really explored the 
nan·ow bank, instead we continue to allow banks to use insured deposits to 1 
fund lending and other activities. 
Another reason we may turn to holding company liability is to prevent 
systemic risk caused by a chain reaction of failing financial institutions. This 
rationale is repeated so often it is taken as tlue. Indeed it is said that the bank 
capital requirements are concerned with systemic risk. It is, however, hard 
to find solid evidence that individual bank failure is a likely source of systemic 
tisk. Hal Scott and George Kaufman recently wrote a provocative paper about 
whether bank regulation contributes to or retards systemic risk. 68 One of their 
biggest challenges in wtiting about the topic came in trying to pin down what 
we mean when we use the tetm "systemic risk." 6 9 On closer examination of 
the available evidence, however, the fear of a bank failure expanding into the 
potential failure of the entire banking system appears unjustified. 70 Histori-
cally, such a catastrophic domino effect is in reality a very rare event. It is 
much more likely that a bank mn would result· in the redepositing of funds 
from weak banks into strong banks. 71 
67 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A). 
68 GEoRGE G. KAUFMAN & KENNETH E. ScoTT, DoEs BANK REGULATION RETARD oR CoN-
TRIBUTE TO SYSTEMIC RisK? (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper 
No. 211, Dec. 2000), available at <papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id = 257927> (the Social 
Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection). 
69Jd. at 2-5. 
70 !d. at 8. 
71 See Anthony Saunders, Bank Holding Companies: Structure, Peiformance and Reform, 
in RESTRUCTURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 159 (William S. Haraf 
& Rose Marie Kushmeider eds., 1988) (citing study that concluded that most runs on individual 
banks would result in redepositing to sound banks). 
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Another explanation for why the banking regulators have developed 
extensive holding company liability rules is what Prof. Howell Jackson has 
called the "cost-defraying hypothesis."72 In short, the deposit insurance funds 
are not inexhaustible, and the regulatory scheme has developed ways to 
recapitalize those depleted funds from sources other than the taxpaying 
public. 73 Such a justification could be grounded on the reasoning that since 
holding companies benefit from the deposit insurance that covers their banking 
subsidiaries, they should pay the price as well. 74 If this is the basis for holding 
company liability one would think that the fair limit of liability should be the 
value of the benefit received, although that has never been seriously proposed. 
Yet another justification for imposing liability on bank holding companies 
is what Prof. Jackson calls the "hungry wolf' hypothesis, which posits that 
holding companies prey upon and exploit their regulated subsidiaries so they 
therefore should be made to relinquish the unfair gains they have extracted 
from their bank affiliates. 75 The potential conflicts of interest that tempt bank 
holding companies to exploit their subsidiaries and their customers are known 
in the banking world as "subtle hazards." 76 While there may be some anecdotal 
72 See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 
HARV. L. REv. 507, 559 (1994) (describing the cost-defraying explanation). 
73 Id. at 559; but see Alfred J.T. Byrne & Judith Bailey, FDIC Addresses Three D&O Lawsuit 
Issues, ABA BANKING J. 47 (Oct. 1992) (the FDIC officially denies that it sues all deep pockets). 
74 An underlying premise of this position is the idea that banks (and indirectly bank holding 
companies) receive a subsidy from the federal govemment. In the words of Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan: 
In this century the Congress has delegated the use of sovereign credit - the power 
to create money and borrow unlimited funds at the lowest possible rate - to support 
the banking system. It has done so indirectly as a consequence of deposit insurance, 
Federal Reserve discount window access, and final riskless payment system 
transactions .... [As a result of the government's major role in protecting the 
banking system, banks get an unfair advantage over other financial services providers 
because banks] determine the level of risk-taking and receive gains therefrom, but 
do not bear the full costs of that risk. The remainder of the risk is transfened to 
the government. 
Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 13, 1997, reprinted in 
83 FED. REs. BuLL. 249 (Apr. 1997). 
75 Jackson, supra note 72, at 564. 
76 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (coining the term). Possible 
subtle hazards that have been identified in the scholarly treatment of the subject include: the 
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evidence that bank holding companies take advantage of their subsidiaries, 77 
there is no clear empirical evidence that holding companies in fact exploit 
their banks to the extent feared by the hungry wolf model. 78 To the extent 
the hungry wolf justification cannot withstand empirical scrutiny, however, 
it loses a great deal of persuasive effect. 
Another common justification for holding company liability is that it helps 
impose "market discipline" on bank management. 7 9 The goal of market 
discipline is to create financial incentives for holding companies to monitor 
the managers of their banking subsidiaries and thereby dampen the risk-taking 
tendenci~s of the bank. The market discipline idea relies on the holding 
companies' financial interest in preventing losses at the holding company level 
to create incentives for monitoring the risk taking of their bank managers. 
While heightened oversight of bank management may result in a more 
conservative bank management, it seems unlikely that increased monitoring 
potential for biased advice to clients designed to benefit the holding company's non-banking 
operations; uneconomical transfers, such as bank loans to troubled holding company subsidia-
ries; bank trust department securities transactions designed to bolster the offerings of an 
investment bank affiliate; predatoty practices and collusion between the bank and other affiliates 
designed to injure other competitors of the affiliates; and the possibility of tying arrangements 
by which bank services and products would only be available in conjunction with the purchase 
of affiliates' products and services, perhaps at an above-market price. See Daniel R. Fischel 
et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 323-30 
(1987) (discussing the "subtle hazards" suggested by the Camp decision); see also James R. 
Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle 
Hazards" in Bank Regulation, 4 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 1, 38-40 (1995) (discussing "subtle 
hazards" in light of the Camp decision and the history of the Glass-Steagall Act). 
77 See Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of 
the "Source of Strength" Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1383 (1991) 
(listing several ways in which bank holding companies might take advantage of their banking 
subsidiaries); see also Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 287, 289-90 (1996) (noting the many situations in which parent corporations 
may take advantage of their subsidiaries). 
78 Jackson, supra note 72, at 573-76 (reviewing and summarizing various studies conceming 
the affect of bank holding company ownership on bank performance and finding "there is little 
evidence supporting, and a considerable amount rebutting, the hungry wolf justification ... "), 
This has been true historically as well. Even back in the free-wheeling 1920's, large commercial 
banks and their investment bank affiliates fared much better than smaller banks that were only 
engaged in commercial banking. See GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL 
AND INVESTMENT BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL AcT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 32 
(1990) (noting that national banks which engaged in both commercial and investment banking 
had a lower failure rate than those that just engaged in commercial banking.) 
79 See generally Helen A. Garten, Market Discipline Revisited, 14 ANN REv. BANKING L. 
187 (1995) (providing an overview of the market discipline debate). 
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by holding companies will result in fewer mn-of-the-mill, non-negligent lapses 
of judgment that unavoidably plague all human activity. 8 0 It seems obvious 
that a certain number of mistakes will occur just because humans make 
mistakes, and bank directors are humans. Ultimately, the market discipline 
hypothesis may overstate the role that directors realistically can play in 
insuring the safety and soundness of the institutions they mn. 8 1 There is a 
limit as to what we can expect directors to do. Their role is to set policy and 
to oversee the officers, not to engage in a hands-on supervision of operations. 82 
In light of that reality, the directors may be ineffectual in stopping operational 
problems. 8 3 If heightened management oversight is the goal, then liability 
ought to be limited to those losses that could have been avoided by diligent 
management and should not include losses resulting from macroeconomic 
trends or simple, non-negligent, lapses of judgment. Again, that has never been 
seriously proposed. 
I have argued elsewhere that to the extent some degree of market discipline 
from the equityholders is desirable, the enhanced capital standards that banks 
80 Although there is some evidence that the business judgment mle as applied in the banking 
context has been modified to hold bank directors to a higher standard than directors generally 
have been subject to, see Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment 
Rule in Banking: Implications for Cmporate Law, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1996), 
historically, bank directors have not been liable for simple lapses of judgment. See, e.g., Muller 
v. Planter's Bank & Tmst, 275 S.W. 750 (Ark. 1925) (holding that bank directors must exercise 
good faith and diligence in managing a bank, but are not liable for mere exercise of poor 
judgment); Warren v. Robinson, 70 P. 989 (Utah 1902) (holding that directors will not be 
responsible for depreciation in value of bank stock when such depreciation results from errors 
of judgment). Although at the time of FIRREA's adoption a debate ensued about the standard 
by which directors actions should be judged, the standard was never lower than negligence, 
that is, we never seriously considered strict liability or a standard of mere poor judgment if 
the decision-making process itself was not negligently defective. 
81 See John D. Hawke, Jr., The Limited Role of Directors in Assuring the Soundness of Banks, 
6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 285 (1987) (arguing tlrat bank directors typically neither have access 
to infmmation nor the banking skills necessary for the effective prevention of bank failure). 
82 Delaware corporate law seems, however, to be pointing in the direction that directors should 
have some system of compliance review in place to monitor corporate activities. See In re 
Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (in a memorandum decision, Chancellor 
Allen suggested that Delaware law and the dictates of federal sentencing guidelines, among 
other things, weigh in favor of requiring a corporation to have in place some form of legal 
compliance oversight); but see Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 
1963) (setting forth the view that a corporation need not have in place "a corporate system 
of espionage to fetTet out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists."). 
83 For example, if the officers of the bank are committing fraud or even just covering their 
mistakes, it will be extremely difficult for any monitor to detect, be it the board of directors 
or the holding company, because the officers can conceal information relatively easily. Hawke, 
supra note 81, at 287. 
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must comply with put enough at stake for the equityholders to monitor bank 
management as well as they can. 84 The biggest problem with the current 
extensive array of holding company obligations is that they are not well 
calibrated to exact the maximum amount of monitoring without over-
penalizing the holding companies. In my mind, beyond the heightened 
attentiveness that the capital standards create, it seems doubtful that the 
enhanced holding company obligations can make the monitoring process any 
more effective or make the role that management plays in maintaining a safe 
and sound bank any more meaningful. Everything after the increased capital 
requirements results in diminishing retums in terms of enhanced monitoring. 85 
Another rationale for imposing subsidiary obligations on the parent would 
be that in reality the two fmmally distinct legal entities are in fact a single 
economic unit and should therefore be regulated as one enterprise. Prof. Phillip 
Blumberg's extensive treatise, The Law of Corporate Groups, explores this 
line of reasoning as it plays out through many different legal techniques and 
in many different areas of law. 86 Viewed through the lens of enterprise 
liability, the fiction of separate corporate personality for each subsidiary in 
a corporate group must give way to the reality of a single economic enterprise. 
Proponents of enterprise liability argue that in order to deal effectively with 
the legal issues of subsidiaries, the law needs to break out of traditional 
paradigms and embrace the idea of a corporate enterprise that cuts across 
particular legal entities. 87 
In the bank holding company context, however, the enterprise idea does 
not hold up as well as its supporters might hope. Banks that are pmt of a bank 
holding company must meet the same requirements that all banks must comply 
with - capital requirements and regulatory restrictions among them - that 
prevent banks from being merely a component. part of a larger enterprise. 
Because our banking scheme insists on treating the legal entity which is the 
bank with great formality, it does not comport well with the strong form of 
84 See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 17. There appears to be a strong connection 
between capital levels and thrift failure. See Lawrence R. Cordell et al., C01porate Ownership 
and the Thrift Crisis, 36 J. L. & EcoN. 719, 724-27 (1993) ("The ability to take on riskier 
investments at higher leverage ratios directly benefitted stock S&L owners, who could capitalize 
these benefits directly through appreciation of their stock holdings."). 
85 See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 17, at 350-53. 
86 See Blumberg, supra note 38. 
87 See Adolph Berle, The The01y of Ente1prise Entity, 47 CoLuM. L. REv. 343, 350 (1947) 
("In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though 
there are two personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been so 
handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of it."). 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rel.75A--04/02 Pub.052) 
GRAMM-LEACH-BILLEY 59 
the enterprise liability idea. Banks are a very special kind of corporation. In 
a throwback to an earlier time, banking remains one of the few businesses 
where one must seek a charter from a governmental authority before engaging 
in business. 88 Banks are also special in that they must comply with capital 
requirements imposed by regulators. 8 9 In addition, as noted above, regulators 
insist that certain activities only be carried on by certain affiliates. 9o Yet 
despite all of the separateness of banks and the restrictions on their ability 
to work together with other holding company affiliates, the law is quick to 
disregard the corporate form of the bank and try through every means available 
to impose liability on the holding company for the obligations of the bank. 91 
In light of the special chartering, capital, and regulatmy treatment of banks, 
they seem to deserve more respect as impetmeable corporate entities than the 
typical corporation, but they actually receive less. The current regulatory 
scheme makes the elaborate efforts to set banks off as independent entities 
within the holding company stmcture appear to be nothing but a charade. 
Unfortunately, as we enter the GLB Act era, the regulatmy scheme lacks 
a principled rationale for ignoring the separate corporate entities in the holding 
company system. We should reconsider the reasons why we think it is 
necessary to impose liability on holding companies and develop a principled 
policy for detetmining when such liability would be appropriate and how great 
the liability should be. 
IV. Why These Issues Matter 
These unanswered questions will become important as the financial services 
industly continues to evolve. Although banks are subject to capital require-
ments, the histmy of banks failure resolution suggests that holding companies 
will be liable for the costs of bank failure above and beyond the loss of the 
capital invested in the bank. As cunently atticulated, banking policy does not 
establish a consistent and coherent mle for holding company liability in excess 
of the capital invested in the bank. If the tme costs of owning a bank are not 
88 Modem banks seem to be products of the ancient "artificial entity" or "concession" theory 
of corporation. See generally Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business C01porations 
Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REv. 105, 106 (1888). In a nutshell, that theory of corporateness holds 
that only the sovereign can give life to a new corporate being, and that the sovereign sometimes 
may create such a person if, as a quid pro quo, the new corporate person promises in its charter 
to perform some socially useful activity for the sovereign. /d. at 113-14. 
89 See 12 C.P.R. pt. 208 App. A. 
90 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
91 See generally Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 17 (discussing the myriad ways of 
imposing liability on bank holding companies). 
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transparent, potential suppliers of capital to the banking system may be 
reluctant to acquire banks, thereby weakening demand for bank capital and 
increasing the cost of that capital. 
In the new era of financial services competition being ushered in by the 
GLB Act, our policies should be careful not to tip the playing field to favor 
one type of financial services provider over another. If the owners of banks 
are subject to liability that the owners of other types of financial institutions 
will not be subject to, banks will be placed at a relative disadvantage. Financial 
services supplied by different types of financial services providers ought to 
be subject to the same constraints regardless of the provider. Yet it seems 
obvious that our system will continue to impose on entities owning banks an 
additional potential cost of doing business - holding company liability to 
resolve a failed bank. The holding company will face uncertain contingent 
liabilities if a bank subsidiary fails, thereby making ownership of a bank 
relatively more expensive than owning, say, an insurance company or 
securities firm, because of the possibly open-ended liability from the source 
of strength doctrine and other devices in the hands of federal banking 
regulators. If banks will be at a disadvantage, some financial services providers 
will evolve to provide bank-like services without crossing the line and actually 
becoming BHCs. 
It may be argued that the increased cost of the bank capital brought about 
by the possible liability for bank failure is offset by the great safety net subsidy 
bestowed upon banks. 92 The safety net subsidy/burden debate has been 
ongoing for years with no clear winner. In my humble opinion, the subsidy 
bestowed by the safety net is probably offset by the regulatory costs, capital 
requirements, and insurance premiums borne by banks. Assuming the costs 
and benefits of the safety net are a wash, the added cost of bank ownership 
resulting from liability for bank failure will make banks relatively less 
attractive to possible owners. 
As the GLB Act's refotms take root and mature, the fuzzy limits of exposure 
for bank ownership may discourage financial services companies with exten-
sive assets, and especially commercial firms, from becoming bank owners 
because the exposure will be too great. Although outright ownership of a batik 
by a commercial firm is not permitted at the present time, we may eventually 
cross that bridge. 93 The suggestion that commercial firms be allowed to own 
92 See Gouvin, Hung1y Wolves, supra note 66, at 963-66. 
93 Since the GLB Act did not address all issues of financial modernization to everyone's 
satisfaction, we may witness some additional legislation to work out the details and to complete 
"unfinished business" left over from the legislation, such as ending the distinction between 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rel.?SA-04/02 Pub.052) 
IV GRAMM-LEACH-BILLEY 61 
banks was advocated seriously in the public policy debates in the years leading 
up to the passage of the GLB Act. 94 Indeed, the "unitary thrift" loophole has 
already permitted commercial firms like General Electric and General Motors 
to operate huge financial businesses within their existing corporate struc-
tures. 95 Even though Title IV of the GLB Act prevents the creation of new 
S&L holding companies with commercial affiliates, it did grandfather the 
existing unitary thrifts and those applications to establish a unitary thrift 
pending as of May 4, 1999. 96 
Yet even with the unitary thrift loophole in abeyance, the GLB Act leaves 
open some possibilities for mixing banking and commerce. First of all, the 
definition of activities that are "financial in nature" or complementary thereto 
that spells out the kinds of affiliates that a FHC may have is extremely broad. 9 7 
As a regular user of the Quicken® personal finance software, I think of it 
as being part of my interface with the banking system. Could a FHC acquire 
Intuit, Inc., the maker of Quicken®, on the theory that the software is either 
"financial in nature" or incidental or complementary thereto? Taking it a step 
further, I rarely encounter a teller at the bank, but frequently use ATM 
machines. Could an FHC acquire Diebold, Incorporated, one of the world's 
leading ATM manufacturers? These will remain academic inquiries for only 
a short time. FHC will push the envelope on permissible activities in just the 
same way BHCs pushed the definition of "closely related to banking" under 
the Bank Holding Company Act. If the costs of bank ownership are not made 
clear, FHCs that have wide-ranging activities may be reluctant to acquire banks 
because of the potentially open-ended exposure for bank failure. 
In order to keep the costs of bank failure from skewing the price for bank 
capital, policy makers ought to consider two ideas. First, they ought to allow 
the prompt conective action provisions to work in their pure form. Essentially, 
"commercial" and "financial" firms. See, e.g., R. Christian Bruce, Financial Modernization: 
More Financial Sen,ices Legislation Needed in Wake of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Experts Say, 75 
BNA Banking Rep. 827 (Dec. 11, 2000); Dunne, Financial Modemization - Unfinished 
Agenda, 117 BANKING L. J. 97 (2000). 
94 See Bill McConnell, Capital Briefs: TreaSIII)' Hears Case for Broader Bank Ownership, 
AM. BANKER, Feb. 4, 1997, at 2. 
95 See Steve Cocheo, Special Briefing: The Banking-Commerce Debate, ABA BANKING J., 
July 1997, at 7 (giving an overview of the history and current status of the intermingling of 
banking and commerce). 
96 See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(9)(C). 
97 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(k)(l) (noting that affiliates of a financial holding company must 
be engaged in business that is "financial in nature" or "incidental to such financial activity" 
or "complementary to a financial activity"), 1843(k)(4) (providing a long laundry list of activities 
that are "financial in nature"). 
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the provisions should operate as an option that will force bank holding 
companies to "put up or shut up." Compliance with the capital directive will 
be the cost of exit. These laws are already on the books, they just need some 
signaling from key regulators that they will be allowed to work as designed. 
There should also be some signal sent clarifying what happens if the holding 
company refuses to inject more capital into the failing bank. Cunently, the 
bank may be placed into receivership, but not much has been said about the 
potential liability of the holding company. I have developed in other articles 
an approach to bank holding company liability that would work well in this 
situation. 98 Under my approach a bank holding company should be liable for 
the failure of its bank subsidiary above and beyond the value of the capital 
lost, only to the extent the bank holding company is found to have used the 
bank subsidiary for purposes that benefit the holding company at the expense 
of the bank as a separate legal and business entity. I believe my approach 
strikes the right balance between respecting the legal forms of the entities and 
imposing liability for acts that unfairly shift the cost of bank failure to 
constituents other than the holding company. 
V. Conclusion 
The GLB Act makes only relatively minor changes in the existing scheme 
of bank holding company liability for the costs of a failed bank. Therefore, 
the existing devices for imposing liability on bank holding companies for bank 
failure will be applied to financial holding companies that own banks, since 
under the Bank Holding Company Act, those financial holding companies will 
be considered bank holding companies as well. 
Although the GLB Act added little to the regulatory tool box, some of the 
devices available in the past have been made less attractive to the regulators 
because of changes in the financial services marketplace. Regulators may be 
tempted to fall back on the source of strength doctrine as an open-ended 
method for imposing liability on bank holding companies. Using such an open-
ended device, however, will affect the attractiveness of bank ownership. A 
broad ranging liability regime that puts all the holding company's assets at 
stake in the event of bank failure will increase the cost of owning a bank 
relative to other financial intermediaries and therefore make bank ownership 
less attractive. On the other hand, a regime that limits the holding company's 
liability to the amount invested in the bank will make bank ownership 
relatively more attractive, but could result in some costs of bank failure being 
shifted away inappropriately from the shareholders on to other parties. I 
98 See Gouvin, Hung1y Wolves, supra note 66. 
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propose that liability for bank failure be governed by the prompt conective 
action scheme and that the limitations on holding company liability contained 
therein be allowed to work as designed. Stopping at the statutory limit may 
be politically difficult, but in order for the scheme to be credible, the regulators 
should signal that they will respect it. With regard to holding companies that 
refuse to guarantee a capital directive, the law should impose liability on the 
holding company only to the extent the holding company improperly employed 
the bank for the benefit of the holding company without regard to the best 
interest of the bank as a separate legal and business entity. 
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